Towards the end of his article, Sober (1992) pivotally asserts that there is a peculiar “confusion” when culture is proposed as a “weak influence when it opposes biology” (p. 35). However, by drawing on the cultural models of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman along with Boyd and Richerson, Sober carefully scrutinizes the misunderstanding that biology, or branches of biology, investigate much more fundamental causes in comparison to the social sciences. To further explain this thought, Sober explains that it is believed that cultural traits must evolve with the need of reproductive fitness, however, through his examples of demographic transitions, he proves otherwise. He arrives to his conclusion by proposing that cultural models do not manifest the mistakes that sociobiologists confront, which is that they apply evolutionary ideas to social sciences. He presents two selection models: type 1 centering on differentiability, type II focusing on hereditability and a third model that rests there are no biological explanations. But these models fall short as they describe the process of natural selection as opposed to the product. Contrary to these ‘pure type’ models, cultural models used by Cavalli-Soforza and Feldman that explain how customs spread, whether it is through horizontal, oblique, vertical transmission. Importantly, these cultural models mix "together the concepts of biological and cultural fitness” (p. 29). The mixing of the two models is a crucial step for it allows for the “confusion” to diminish. Ultimately, the points Sober raise are fairly similar to Griesemer’s conclusions that the separation of evolutionary biologists, which think in terms of “why,” and other biologists which think in terms of “how,” can create a polarized process of investigation and conclusion determination. This is clearly seen by the conclusions social scientists and biologists draw. For example, biologists will oftentimes describe quantitative consequences of cultural influences whereas social scientists will make qualitative ones. In the example of altruism evolving, a biological model would purely eliminate it whereas a social scientific approach would show how this feature can evolve when “culture is included in the model” (p. 30). Thus, there is a necessity for both as Griesemer propose. For the conclusions that Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman drew about demographic transitions could not be made had “a purely biological and noncultural process were postulated” (p. 30).